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Jeffreys: The Role of Mental Health Professionals in Child Custody Resoluti

NOTES

THE ROLE OF MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS

IN CHILD CUSTODY RESOLUTION
"Legal trainingand experience are of little practical help in solving the complex problems of human relations.""

As the number of divorces in the United States rises, 2 courts are
increasingly called upon to resolve child custody disputes.' From the
outset of their involvement in custody resolution, courts have attempted to develop legal standards for resolving disputes with serious
and complex mental health considerations. Today, in most jurisdictions, a dominant standard has emerged-the "best interests of the
child" standard.4 According to this standard, the child's best interI. Painter v. Bannister, 258 Iowa 1390, 1391, 140 N.W.2d 152, 153, cert. denied, 385
U.S. 949 (1966).
2. U.S. Bureau of the Census, StatisticalAbstract of the United States: 1986, at 79
(106th ed. 1986). Although data suggest that the number of divorces in the United States
reached an apex in 1981, the preliminary data for 1983 suggest that the number of divorces is
again rising. Id. at 81.
3. See Kubie, Provisionsfor the Care of Children of Divorced Parents: A New Legal
Instrument, 73 YALE L.J. 1197, 1197 (1964); Recommendation of the Law Revision Commission to the 1985 Legislature, Relating to the Child Custody Decision-Making Process, 19
COLUM. J.L. & SoC. PROBS. 105, 107 (1985) [hereinafter Commission Recommendation on
Child Custody].
4. ALA. CODE § 30-3-1 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.060 (1983); ARIz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 25-332 (Supp. 1986); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-2726 (Supp. 1985); CAL CIV. CODE §
4608 (West Supp. 1987); COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-124 (Supp. 1986); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 46b-56 (West 1986); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 722 (1974); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13
(West 1985); IDAHO CODE § 32-717 (1983); ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 602 (Smith-Hurd
Supp. 1986); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-1-11.5-21(a) (West Supp. 1986); IOWA CODE ANN. §
598.41 (West Supp. 1986); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1610(3) (Supp. 1986); Ky. REV. STAT. §
403.270 (1984); LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 146 (West Supp. 1985); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
19, § 752(5) (Supp. 1986); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § 31 (West Supp. 1986); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.23 (West Supp. 1986); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.17(1) (West Supp.
1987); MiSS. CODE ANN. § 93-5-24 (Supp. 1986); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.375(2) (Vernon
Supp. 1987); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-212 (1985); NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.480 (1986); N.H.
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ests are of paramount importance in resolving the custody dispute.
As a combination of litigation and psychology, the best interests
standard has forced courts to consider the mental health of all parties involved in the litigation.5 This Note concludes, however, that
because of the judiciary's lack of appropriate training in the subject
of mental health, professionals in the mental health field should play
a more significant role in either child custody litigation or, preferably, nonadversarial forms of dispute resolution, particularly
mediation.
This Note is divided into three sections. The first section examines the standards which have been created to aid the judiciary in
resolving custody disputes. These standards include the historical
common law perspective, 6 the tender years presumption,7 the primary caretaker rule, 8 and the best interests of the child standard. 9
The second section examines the limited role that mental health professionals currently play in child custody litigation and proposals for
enhancing that role in the future.10 The third section describes mediation as an alternative to child custody litigation and analyzes its
potential for integrating the mental health professional into the custody process in order to protect the child's mental health before, during, and after divorce proceedings.11
I.

DEVELOPMENT OF CHILD CUSTODY STANDARDS

A.

Historical Common Law Perspective

In 1923, the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors summarized
the common law perspective on child custody disputes, commenting
that "the father, being a suitable person, is entitled to the sole cusREV. STAT. ANN. § 458:17 (1983); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-9 (1986); N.Y. DoM. REL LAW §
240 (McKinney 1986); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.2 (1984); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.1
(1981); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.04(A) (Page Supp. 1985); OKLA.STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §
1277.1 (West Supp. 1987); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-160 (1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-101
(Supp. 1986); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-10 (1984); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 665(a) (Supp.
1986); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.190 (1986); Wyo.STAT. § 20-2-113 (Supp. 1986).
5. UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE AcT § 402 (1973), reprinted in W.
WADLINGTON, CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON DOMESTIC RELATIONS 654 (1984) (physical
and mental health are examined in deciding the best interests of the child) [hereinafter

UMDA].
6. See infra text accompanying notes 12-19.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 20-33.
8.

See Infra text accompanying notes 34-41.

9. See infra text accompanying notes 42-56.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 57-109.
11.

See infra text accompanying notes 110-177.
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tody [of the child] even as against the mother."1' 2 The bases of this

rule were generally accepted social policies underlying the common
law: the right of the man in the divorce action to custody of chat-

tels,13 the child legally being considered a chattel; 4 the father's ability to teach the child a trade;1 5 the father's role as an authority fig-

ure, enabling the child to be raised with proper discipline; 8 and the
reciprocal rights of father and child, wherein the child owes the fa-

ther allegiance for support previously received. 7
In spite of the common law's apparent absolute preference for
males in custody disputes, the requirement that the father be "a suit-

able person" actually gave courts considerable flexibility in awarding

custody.' 8 Among the factors which led courts to conclude that the

father was not a suitable person was the belief that fathers were not
as qualified as mothers to care for very young children. This belief
eventually prompted courts to adopt the child custody standard

known as the tender years presumption.
B.

The Tender Years Presumption

The tender years presumption requires the court to grant custody of children "of tender years" to the mother, unless she is found

to be unfit.20 To justify this standard, courts reasoned that only the
12. Pfeiffer v. Pfeiffer, 99 Conn. 154, 157, 121 A. 174, 175 (1923); see also Kelsey v.
Green, 69 Conn. 291, 37 A. 679 (1897) (the father has the legal right to the custody of his
children).
13. Cf. In re Thorne, 240 N.Y. 444, 148 N.E. 630 (1925) (child's domicile was at issue). The patriapotestas power, which can be defined as parental authority, can be analogized
to the father's general right to all chattels after the divorce.
14. Brown v. De Witt, 320 Mich. 156, 165, 30 N.W.2d 818, 821 (1948) (recognizing
the patriapotestas as the father's power to treat his infant children as chattels). Contra Kelsey v. Green, 69 Conn. 291, 300, 37 A. 679, 682 (1897).
15. See supra note 13.
16. Cf In re Thorne, 240 N.Y. 444, 148 N.E. 630 (1925) (the role of the father as head
of the family makes the child treat the father with the proper respect which therefore creates
discipline).
17. Id. One court offered another rationale for the historical common law perspective.
"[F]rom general experience, the natural and trained affections of the child attach to the father, and those of the father to the child." Kelsey v. Green, 69 Conn. 291, 300, 37 A. 679, 682
(1897).
This proposition seems to be in direct conflict with the rationale of the tender years presumption, another standard which courts developed to aid child custody resolution. See infra

notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
18. See, e.g., Pfeiffer v. Pfeiffer, 99 Conn. 154, 121 A. 174 (1923); see also Umlauf v.
Umlauf, 128 Ill. 378, 21 N.E. 600 (1889) (calling father a man of "good character").

19. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Jenkins, 173 Wis. 592, 181 N.W. 826 (1921).
20.

Harding v. Harding, 377 P.2d 378, 379 (Alaska 1962).
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mother can give the love and affection necessary to enable the young
child to mature properly. 21 Aside from the questionable validity of
this presumption, there are several legal and practical problems connected with its use in resolving child custody disputes.
One apparent difficulty with the tender years presumption is
that courts are not given any guidance regarding when a child is "of
tender years." 22 One court tried to solve the problem of defining this
phrase by stating that "obviously an infant in the suckling stage is of
tender years, while an adolescent fourteen years of age or older is
not . . ."23 This definition is of little use, however, because it does
not give guidance as to the presumption's applicability to children
between the suckling stage and fourteen years.
In addition to its definitional problems, the tender years pre-

sumption places the father at an unfair disadvantage in child custody
litigation. Unlike the mother, who benefits from the presumption, the

father must first prove that the mother is incompetent; and then
must prove his own competence in order to prevail.2"
A series of United States Supreme Court cases involving classi-

fications based on gender indicates that the unfairness inherent in
the tender years presumption may be of constitutional dimensions. In
2
26
Reed v. Reed,2 5 Stanley v. Illinois, and Frontierov. Richardson, 7
21. See, e.g., Umlauf v. Umlaut', 128 Ill. 378, 21 N.E. 600 (1889); Jenkins v. Jenkins,
173 Wis. 592, 181 N.W. 826 (1921). In employing the tender years presumption, one court
found that even the "weakest of women," such as those who may be indiscreet about sexual
conduct, possessed this "mother love," which entitled them to preference in child custody disputes. Freeland v. Freeland, 92 Wash. 482, 159 P. 698 (1916).
22. See Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357 (W. Va. 1981) (the concept of tender years is
elastic).
23. Id. at 358 (syllabus) (reversing a custody grant to the father of a young child whose
unwed mother was his primary caretaker).
24. Roth, The Tender Years Presumptionin Child Custody Disputes, 15 J. FAM. L. 423,
440 (1976-1977).
25. 404 U.S. 71 (1971). In this case, the Supreme Court invalidated an Idaho Code
provision which gave men, in preference over women, the opportunity to be appointed administrators of estates. The Court held that the Idaho Code could not abridge the right of women to
equal protection under the law unless there was a substantial reason for so doing. The Court
concluded that Idaho's reason for the code provision, reduction of the caseload on the judiciary, was legitimate; however, the means employed by Idaho to reduce the caseload were
unconstitutional.
26. 405 U.S. 645 (1972). The Court struck down legislation which required a father
who was not married to the mother when the child was born to surrender his child to the state,
without a hearing, upon the death of the mother. The Court reasoned that, because unwed
mothers, as well as men and women who had children while married, were given hearings to
decide if they were permitted to keep their children, it would violate equal protection to force
unwed fathers to surrender their children to the state without hearings.
27. 411 U.S. 677 (1973). The Court struck down federal legislation which allowed only
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the Court considered legislation designed to reduce the judiciary's
heavy caseload by means which discriminated on the basis of sex.
While recognizing the usefulness of a reduced caseload, the Court
used an equal protection analysis and held in each case that the purpose of the legislation was not substantially related to the discriminatory means chosen for its implementation. Therefore, the legislation was struck down.28
In State ex rel. Watts v. Watts,2 ' the New York Family Court
seized upon the holdings in Reed, Stanley, and Frontiero and declared that the tender years presumption was unconstitutional. 0 The
court found that the presumption imposed a burden on the father
which was contrary to the principles of equal protection because
"persons similarly situated, whether male or female, must be accorded even-handed treatment by the law."'" In reaching this conclusion, the court adhered to the Supreme Court's reasoning, noting
that one party cannot be presumed to be fit at the expense of the
other merely to speed cases through the judicial process.32
The rigidity of both the historical common law perspective and
the tender years presumption was often tempered by the recognition
that the child's best interest is the most important consideration in
child custody cases.3 3 Some courts demonstrated their concern with
the child's best interests, along with the need to avoid the definitional
and possible constitutional problems of the tender years presumption,
by adopting the primary caretaker rule for resolving custody
disputes.3 4
male military members to receive dental benefits for themselves and their spouses, and which
allowed only male military members to receive increased living allowances based on their marital status, on the basis of the fifth amendment's due process clause. The government claimed
that this legislation was adopted to speed the processing of claims. The Court held that the
federal government could not provide dissimilar treatment for male and female military members because the constitution recognizes a higher value than speed and efficiency.
28. See supra notes 25-27.
29. 77 Misc. 2d 178, 350 N.Y.S.2d 285 (Fam. Ct. 1973).
30. Id. at 183, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 290-91. Contra Thompson v. Thompson, 57 Ala. App.
57, 326 So. 2d 124 (1975); Broussard v. Broussard, 320 So. 2d 236 (La. Ct. App. 1975);
Gordon v. Gordon, 577 P.2d 1271 (Okla.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 863 (1978) (holding the
tender years presumption constitutional).
31. 77 Misc. 2d at 183, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 290.
32. See, e.g., Stanley, 405 U.S. at 656.
33. See Mullins v. Becker, 113 Conn. 526, 529, 155 A. 705, 707 (1931).
34. See, e.g., In re Maxwell, 8 Ohio App. 3d 302, 456 N.E.2d 1218 (1982); Garska v.
McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357 (W. Va. 1981).
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Primary CaretakerRule

The primary caretaker rule states that the parent who is primarily responsible for the caring and nurturing of the child before
the divorce should be granted custody after the divorce, as long as
the parent is found to be fit.3 5 A primary factor underlying courts'

adoption of this rule is the desire to foster the child's psychological
development.

8

Courts do not wish to sever the close emotional rela-

tionship which developed between the primary parent and the child
37
before initiation of the divorce proceeding.
The primary caretaker rule circumvents the problems inherent

in the gender-based standards of custody resolution.38 Although it is
arguable that the primary caretaker rule is in reality a gender-based

standard because the mother is usually found to be the primary caretaker, this inference ignores the increasing number of fathers who
remain at home to take primary responsibility for the children.39 In
rejecting the idea that the primary caretaker rule is merely a restatement of the tender years presumption, the Iowa Supreme Court
noted the "[m]odern redefinition and adjustment of traditional parental roles has greatly diluted the strength of the inference" that
only women are primary caretakers.40
35. See Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 358 (W. Va. 1981) (syllabus).
The Garska court listed ten criteria to aid courts in resolving which parent is the primary
caretaker. The primary caretaker is the parent who:
1) prepares and plans the child's meals;
2) bathes, grooms, and dresses the child;
3) purchases, cleans, and cares for the child's clothing;
4) supplies the child with medical care, such as nursing a child's wounds or taking
a child to the physician;
5) arranges the child's interraction with friends;
6) arranges alternative care for the child, ie., finding a baby-sitter or day-care
center;
7) puts the child to bed, attends to the child during the night, and wakes the child
up in the morning;
8) is responsible for the child's disciplining;
9) supplies the child with societal education, i.e., religious or cultural;
10) is responsible for teaching the child elementary skills such as reading, writing,
and arithmetic.
Id. at 363.
36. In re Derby, 31 Or. App. 803, 807, 571 P.2d 562, 564, modified on other grounds,
31 Or. App. 1333, 572 P.2d 1080 (1977).
37. Id.
38. See supra notes 24-31 and accompanying text.
39. In re Derby, 31 Or. App. 803, 571 P.2d 562, modified on other grounds, 31 Or.
App. 1333, 572 P.2d 1080 (1977); In re Bowen, 219 N.W.2d 683 (Iowa 1974).
40. In re Bowen, 219 N.W.2d 683, 688 (Iowa 1974).
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Courts which invoke the primary caretaker rule assume that
giving custody of the child to the primary caretaker is in the child's
best interests because of the close emotional relationship that has
developed between the child and the primary caretaker.4 1 The conclusion that the child has a close and positive emotional tie with the
primary caretaker, however, may not be invariably true because it
disregards the possibility that the child does not have a psychologically beneficial relationship with the primary caretaker parent.
Therefore, while the primary caretaker rule is rationalized as being
in the best interests of the child, most jurisdictions have retained the
flexibility associated with the best interests of the child standard.4 2
D. Best Interests of the Child Standard
The landmark case which adopted the best interests of the child
standard as the sole criterion for deciding child custody is Chapsky
v. Wood. 3 In Chapsky, the court reasoned that in awarding custody,
"the paramount consideration is, what will promote the welfare of
the child. ' '44 A majority of jurisdictions have chosen to adhere to this
reasoning and have incorporated the best interests standard into
45
their statutory codes.
Although theoretically satisfying, this standard for resolving
child custody disputes is difficult for courts to apply objectively. After attempting to define exactly what constitutes best interests, one
court concluded that "'best interests of the child' is an example of a
legal term having [no] peculiar meaning
. 46 Clearly, courts
employing the best interests standard continue to have a great deal
of judicial discretion. This discretion has been somewhat curtailed,
however, by both statutory and case law, which have established
guidelines to aid courts in making decisions regarding the child's
best interests.4 These guidelines include stability of the environment
41. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
42. See supra note 4.
43.

26 Kan. 650 (1881).

44. Id. at 654.
45. See supra note 4.
46. Hogge v. Kimbrow, 631 S.W.2d 603, 605 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982).
47. See Price, "Best Interests" and "MaterialChange" Factors in Child Custody and
Visitation Modification Suits, 46 TEx. B.J. 1228, 1230 (1983) (best interests is approached on
a case-by-case basis).
48. Joint custody is seen by commentators as narrowing the broad scope of the best
interests of the child standard. Joint custody is praised, however, as promoting the child's
welfare, Scott & Derdeyn, Rethinking Joint Custody, 45 OHIo ST. L.J. 455, 470 (1984), the

same thing that the best interests standard is designed to foster, see supra note 44 and accom-
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in which the child will live,4 9 the relative "wholesomeness" of op-

tional environments, 50 the characteristics of the parent and child (not
including gender), 51 the general parenting ability,52 and the specific
conduct of the parties during the marriage.5"
Several states have incorporated the list of criteria promulgated

5
in section 402 of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act (UMDA) 4
into their legislation for deciding best interests in child custody.55
Among the important criteria suggested by the UMDA for consideration in child custody cases is "the mental and physical health of all
individuals involved." 56 Despite the critical, even decisive, importance of mental health in such cases, the judiciary seems ill-equipped
to adjudicate that factor, at least as compared to the mental health
profession.

II.

LITIGATION AND THE MENTAL HEALTH EXPERT

A. Admitting Mental Health Expert Opinions
In the adversary process, mental health opinions are most often
heard through the testimony of expert witnesses. In child custody
cases, however, there is a dispute over the admissibility of expert
panying text. Statutory codes have also embodied joint custody as a preferred form for resolving the child's best interests. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.060(c) (1983) (joint custody will
be awarded only if it is in the child's best interests).
49. Price, supra note 47, at 1230.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1230-31.
52. Id. at 1231.
53. Id. at 1231-32. One court summarized its consideration of best interests as follows:
[T]he best interest of this child lies in placing it in an environment in which it can
have love, security, discipline, adequate care and attention and proper training,
where relative stability can be maintained, and objective and positive influences may
be brought upon her. The atmosphere must be as free of tensions, bitterness and
hostility towards the other party as is possible under the circumstances. The child
should be taught to love and respect each parent and the opportunities for its mind
to be poisoned against either parent should be minimized.
Coles v. Coles, 204 A.2d 330, 330-31 (D.C. 1964).
54. UMDA, supra note 5, § 402.
55. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-332 (Supp. 1986); COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-124
(Supp. 1986); DEL.CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 722 (1974); IDAHO CODE § 32-717 (1983); ILL ANN.
STAT. ch. 40, § 602 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-1-11.5-21(a) (West
Supp. 1986); Ky. REV. STAT. § 403.270 (1984); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.17(1) (West Supp.
1987); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.375(2) (Vernon Supp. 1987); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-212
(1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-9 (1986); OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.04(c) (Page Supp.
1986); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 665(b) (Supp. 1986); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 26.09.190
(1986).
56. UMDA, supra note 5, § 402(5) (emphasis added).
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testimony of mental health professionals. 57
Courts that refuse to admit the expert testimony of mental

health professionals at child custody trials 58 emphasize that the
mental health opinions of each expert will be in accord with the beliefs of the party who has retained the expert. 59 Although expert tes-

timony in general, if admitted, would most often reflect the litigants'

positions,60 courts that refuse to admit mental health expert testi-

mony recognize that judges lack the ability and training to weigh the
relative importance and probative value of conflicting psychological
testimony.' Courts have also taken the position that expert testimony of mental health professionals is unnecessary because judges
are capable of evaluating the parties. In DiRusso v. DiRusso,62 the
appellate court found that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion
by refusing to order psychological investigation of all the parties to
the litigation. The appellate court reasoned that the trial judge's contact with the parties was sufficient to enable the judge to decide the

custody issue without a psychologist's aid."3
Courts that admit mental health expert testimony in child custody cases, as well as courts that refuse expert testimony, acknowl57. See infra notes 58-73 and accompanying text.
58. See, e.g., DiRusso v. DiRusso, 12 Mass. App. 892, 422 N.E.2d 463 (1981).
59. See, e.g., Deacon v. Deacon, 207 Neb. 193, 199, 297 N.W.2d 757, 761 (1980) (conflicting evidence that reflected badly on the other spouse was offered by both litigants). See
also Silberman & Schepard, Consultants' Comments on the New York Law Revision Commission Recommendation on the Child Custody Dispute Resolution Process, 19 COLUM. J.L.
& Soc. PaoBs. 399, 411 (1985) (in an adversary model, experts may have allegiance to the
hiring party).
60. Id. There are two problems associated with accepting mental health testimony, however, and both are inherent in any trial which involves experts. First, the party to the litigation
who can afford the most prestigious witnesses will have a more convincing case to present to
the fact-finder. Galanter, Why the "'Haves"Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of
Legal Change, 9 LAW AND Soc'Y REV. 95, 103-04 (1974). Second, there will be an overproduction of mental health expert testimony from each litigant. See Watson, The Children of
Armageddon: Problems of Custody Following Divorce, 21 SYRACUSE L. Rav. 56, 63 (1969).
This overproduction would tend to increase the length of the trial and, therefore, it would
increase a child's psychological stress by leaving his fate uncertain for a longer period of time
than if no experts were permitted. Id. at 75, 77.
61. See, e.g., Watson, supra note 60, at 62-63 (discussing problems resulting from judicial inability to address psychological issues). Former Chief Justice Traynor of the California
Supreme Court noted in his concurrence in Howes v. Cohen, 42 Cal. 2d 91, 265 P.2d 888
(1954), that "[p]sychology is not an exact science. If expert testimony were introduced in
cases such as this in all probability it would be in conflict. The ordinary judge. . . lacks the
omniscience accurately to evaluate all of the various considerations that may enter into a custody problem." Id. at 97, 265 P.2d at 892.
62. 12 Mass. App. 892, 422 N.E.2d 463 (1981).
63. Id. at 893, 422 N.E.2d at 464.
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edge that the mental health profession is a field in which judges have
limited knowledge. 6 4 It is the position of some courts, however, that
mental health experts should be allowed to testify because their testimony allows judges to consider the mental health profession's viewpoint.65 In In re Auer,66 the court held that expert testimony could
be considered for whatever illumination it might add in identifying
the best interests of the child.67 This position was further expanded
in In re Gove,6 8 wherein the court held that it could not determine
the mother's fitness for custody purposes without a psychiatric
examination.69
Where courts do admit mental health expert testimony, that determination, which is made by the trial judge, will not be reversed on
appeal unless it is clearly erroneous.70 If mental health expert testimony is admitted, it cannot be determinative on any issue but is,
rather, advisory to the court.71 The court may not, however, totally
disregard the expert testimony;72 it should be considered by the court
as any other piece of evidence. 3
B.

Independent Mental Health Investigation:Evidentiary and
Due Process Requirements

If parties in child custody litigation do not wish to offer expert
mental health testimony, or if the court needs more information to
clarify expert testimony already received, the attorneys may stipulate that the judge may order an independent mental health investi64. See Watson, supra note 60, at 65; see also Howes v. Cohen, 42 Cal. 2d 91, 97, 265
P.2d 888, 892 (1954) (Traynor, J., concurring).
65. See, e.g., In re Auer, 86 Ill. App. 3d 84, 407 N.E.2d 1034 (1980).

66. Id.
67. Id. at 90, 407 N.E.2d at 1037.
68.

117 Ariz. 324, 572 P.2d 458 (1977).

69. Id. at 328, 572 P.2d at 462.
70.

See Ganrud v. Smith, 206 N.W.2d 311, 314 (Iowa 1973), where the court stated

that opinion testimony will be allowed if it will aid the jury and is based on some special
training. Admission of opinion evidence will not be a reversible error unless its admission was a
manifest abuse of the judge's discretion. Admission of expert testimony causes reversible error
when the expert is not qualified in the field in which he is offering an opinion, In re O'Neal,
303 N.W.2d 414, 420-21 (Iowa 1981), or, when the testimony of the expert shows the method
used to reach the opinion was unreliable. DuBois v. DuBois, 240 Ga. 314, 315, 240 S.E.2d

706, 707 (1977).
71. See Fewel v. Fewel, 23 Cal. 2d 431, 435-36, 144 P.2d 592, 594-95 (1943); Washburn v. Washburn, 49 Cal. App. 2d 581, 589-90, 122 P.2d 96, 101 (1942).
72. Mansukhani v. Pailing, 318 N.W.2d 748, 751-55 (N.D. 1982) (holding that the

court cannot arbitrarily disregard expert testimony).
73.

In re Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 376 Mass. 252, 269, 381 N.E.2d 565, 575 (1978).
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gation 4 Such stipulations may, however, be disregarded if found to
be contrary to the best interests of the child. 5
Reversible error occurs when a judge accepts an independent
mental health investigation without receiving stipulations from both
litigants' attorneys. 76 The error is deemed reversible on two grounds:7

violation of the basic evidentiary right to cross-examine witnesses,
and violation of constitutional due process through delegation of the
judge's authority. 8 These two grounds for reversal are the major
stumbling blocks to greater involvement of mental health professionals in the resolution of child custody disputes in the adversary
system.
1. Evidentiary Requirements. - If an independent mental
health report is received by the court, an evidentiary problem arises
because neither party has an opportunity to cross-examine the author. If the litigants' attorneys stipulate to the admission of a mental
health report, there can be no argument on appeal that there was no
opportunity to cross-examine the report's author. 7 Therefore, the
question posed by the evidentiary requirement of cross-examination
is whether the evidence of an independent mental health report can
be used by the court in making its final custody determination when
no stipulation exists.
Two important interests exist in child custody disputes where an
independent mental health report is present: the best interests of the
child and the evidentiary requirement of cross-examination.8" While
74. See Rea v. Rea, 195 Or. 252, 261-72, 245 P.2d 884, 888-91 (1952) (asserting that
the judge can consider independent investigation if a stipulation exists); In re Goddard, 57 Or.
App. 390, 644 P.2d 651 (1982) (citing Rea with approval); In re Jewell, 51 Or. App. 129, 624
P,2d 1092 (1981) (citing Rea with approval).
75. Watkins v. Watkins, 221 Ind. 293, 297, 47 N.E.2d 606, 607 (1943); see also Blue v.
Brooks, 261 Ind. 338, 344, 303 N.E.2d 269, 273 (1973) (the trial court was to decide best
interests, not a psychological expert); Truden v. Jacquay, 480 N.E.2d 974, 979 (Ind. App.
1985) (the parties agreed to stipulations allowing the court to interview the child, but the court
cannot decide best interests exclusively on the child's interview).
76. Rea v. Rea, 195 Or. 252, 261-72, 245 P.2d 884, 888-91 (1952).
77. Id. at 257, 245 P.2d at 886.
78. Williams v. Williams, 8 Ill. App. 2d 1, 130 N.E.2d 291 (1955). Cf. Rea v. Ra, 195
Or. 252, 245 P.2d 884 (1952). While due process is not mentioned, the Rea court stressed that
there is a "time-honored rule, supported by constitutional mandate, that no court shall be
secret and that justice shall be administered openly. The right to confront and cross-examine
witnesses lies at the base of our judicial system." Id. at 257, 245 P.2d at 886. This implies that
the due process clause is the constitutional clause that is violated in these cases.
79. See Rea v. Rea, 195 Or. 252, 262, 245 P.2d 884, 888 (1952).
80. See Walter v. Waiter, 61 111. App. 2d 476, 209 N.E.2d 691 (1965); In re Rosmis, 26
Ill. App. 2d 226, 167 N.E.2d 826 (1960); Williams v. Williams, 8 Ill. App. 2d 1, 130 N.E.2d
291 (1955).
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courts consider both interests, they have consistently held that the
right to cross-examine the author of the report supersedes the best
interests of the child.81 For example, in In re Rosmis, 2 the Illinois
Appellate Court considered both of these interests and concluded
that the trial judge's deliberations must be limited to the record
made in open court. Thus, anyone who renders a report to the court
should be subjected to cross-examination. 3 Subsequent to Rosmis,
the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals confronted a similar
issue in Rohrbaugh v. Rohrbaugh,8 4 where the court held that if evidence which is improperly admitted is not used by the court in its
final decision there is no reversible error.8 5 At least as far as these
two courts are concerned, it can be concluded that if a judge receives
an independent mental health report and uses it in his child custody
resolution without a stipulation, he is depriving the litigants of their
rights to examine the report's author in a courtroom setting, thus
creating reversible error.88
2. Due Process Requirements. - A court that desires to use a
mental health opinion, whether in the form of oral testimony or written reports, must also consider due process requirements.8 7 The problem raised by a due process analysis concerns the degree of emphasis
that a court may place on a mental health opinion when making its
final custody determination.
Courts have held that the judge, in his role as decisionmaker,
may not overemphasize evidence provided by a mental health expert. 8 Since due process prohibits the court from delegating its au81.

See, e.g., Walter v. Walter, 61 I1.App. 2d 476, 209 N.E.2d 691 (1965); In re

Rosmis, 26 III. App. 2d 226, 167 N.E.2d 826 (1960).
82. 26 111.
App. 2d 226, 167 N.E.2d 826 (1960).

83. See id. at 231, 167 N.E.2d at 829.
84. 136 W. Va. 708, 68 S.E.2d 361 (1951), overruled on other grounds, 161 W. Va.
332, 242 S.E.2d 248 (1978).

85. Id. at 722, 68 S.E.2d at 366.
86. See supra text accompanying notes 82-85.
87. See Deacon v. Deacon, 207 Neb. 193, 197-98, 297 N.W.2d 757, 762 (1980); Nelson
v. Nelson, 180 Or. 275, 282-84, 176 P.2d 648, 651-52 (1947).

88. "Over-emphasize" is a term that courts have implied in their decisions, and they
have given it various definitions. See, e.g., Mansukhani v. Pailing, 318 N.W.2d 748 (N.D.
1982) (court cannot arbitrarily disregard expert testimony); Fewel v. Fewel, 23 Cal. 2d 431,

144 P.2d 592 (1943) (judge need not allow the decision of an investigator to be binding on the
court). One court synthesized various holdings and concluded that a court can consider expert
testimony as it would any other piece of evidence, but such evidence cannot be determinative
because it was offered by an expert. In re Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 376 Mass. 252, 381 N.E.2d
565 (1978).
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thority to weigh evidence to a nonjudicial source,"9 any court deciding custody based exclusively on mental health expert testimony at
trial, or on evidence of an independent mental health report, violates
due process and thereby creates reversible error. 90
As a result of the evidentiary and due process requirements,
change in the traditional child custody litigation process by significantly enhancing the role of mental health professionals appears unlikely. Nevertheless, courts are recognizing their own inabilities in
situations where child custody determinations must be made. One
judge described child custody decisions as "agonizing"; 92 another
commented that he felt "anguished" 93 when deciding difficult custody cases. For this reason, several commentators have suggested alternatives for resolving custody disputes which could be incorporated
94
into the basic adversary process.
C.

Proposals to Aid Courts in Resolving Child Custody
Disputes Through Litigation

One proposal to combat the problems inherent in child custody
resolution through the adversary process, 95 which has been given
much scholarly consideration, can be called the "special judge"

model.9 6 In this model, a behavioral psychologist judge would be ap-

pointed to hear custody cases with a legal judge in order to promote
the psychological best interests of the child, and to compensate for
the legal judge's inadequate psychological training. The chief asset
of this model is the ability to bring the insight of psychology into
child custody disputes, thereby eliminating the need for multiple ex89. See Rea v. Rea, 195 Or. 252, 277, 245 P.2d 884, 888 (1952).
90. Id.
91. See generally Painter v. Bannister, 258 Iowa 1390, 140 N.W.2d 152, cert. denied,
385 U.S. 949 (1966); Dodd v. Dodd, 93 Misc. 2d 641, 403 N.Y.S.2d 401 (Sup. Ct. 1978);
O'Shea v. Brennan, 88 Misc. 2d 233, 387 N.Y.S.2d 212 (Sup. Ct. 1976) (all recognizing the
difficulties inherent in child custody determination).
92. Dodd v. Dodd, 93 Misc. 2d 641, 643, 403 N.Y.S.2d 401, 402 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
93. O'Shea v.Brennan, 88 Misc. 2d 233, 237, 387 N.Y.S.2d 212, 216 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
94. See infra notes 95-109 and accompanying text.
95. The problems involved in child custody resolution through the litigation process are
the judge's lack of training to weigh mental health testimony, see supra note 61 and accompanying text, the litigants' unequal economic positions, see supra note 60, and the overproduction
of expert testimony, see supra note 60.
96. See Watson, supra note 60, at 79. Dr. Andrew Watson is the proponent and chief
advocate of this model. Dr. Watson refers to a modification of the judiciary to include behavioral science "judges." Id. For purposes of this Note, this model for integrating behavioral
scientists into that judiciary is termed the "special judge" model.
97. Id. See also supra notes 61 & 64 and accompanying text.
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pert testimony.98 This model would also lead to a desirable crosseducation between courts and psychologists. 9
The law judge, however, may not desire the input of psychological viewpoints during the trial or during deliberations because he or
she may feel equipped to handle the custody issues by virtue of experience in the field. Therefore, a major problem inherent in the "special judge" model is that the behavioral psychologist judge could develop into an adviser to the legal judge on psychological matters. If
the psychologist judge becomes merely an adviser to the legal judge,
the delegation of duty/due process problems previously raised in
connection with the introduction of expert testimony could arise.100
Furthermore, if only two judges sit as a team to decide custody, a
difference of opinion between the two would render the court unable
to resolve the custody dispute. Thus, despite the advantages of the
"special judge" model, these two major disadvantages have precluded its acceptance as a viable alternative.
In a 1977 address to the Family Law Section of the New York
State Bar Association, Chief Judge Sol Wachtler of the New York
State Court of Appeals advocated a system which tries to eliminate
both of the problems inherent in the "special judge" model.101 Judge
Wachtler's system may be called the "behavioral panel" model.' 02
To incorporate the psychological perspective into custody determination, Judge Wachtler's model calls for child custody disputes to be
resolved by panels dominated by trained behavioral specialists. 0 3
These panels would be comprised of psychiatrists, psychologists, and
members of the bar who have specialized in family law.' 0 4 Determinations made by this panel would be binding on a court and subject
to limited review.105
Another model which completely removes the judge from custody determination is the "informal panel" model.' 06 Under this
98. Id. at 75, 79.
99. Id. "The presence of both legal and psychological experts on the bench would immediately begin to cross-educate the parties to the decision-making process. Each would progressively learn from the other the problems involved in judicial handling of these matters." Id. at
79.
100. See supra notes 87-90.
101. Meyer & Schlissel, Child Custody Following Divorce: How [sic] Grasp the Nettle?, 54 N.Y. ST. B. 496, 498 (1982).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. The proponent of this view is Dennis Lynch, a matrimonial practitioner in Syra-
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model, an informal panel would be comprised of a parent, a specialist certified in child development, and an attorney specializing in
family law, with a youth of suitable age and discretion as an advi10 7
sory member.
With more members sitting on a panel, the likelihood of an
equal split between the judges, which exists in the "special judge"
model, is greatly reduced. These approaches, however, raise the same
due process problems inherent in the "special judge" model, because
a judge may not delegate authority to a nonjudicial source. 108 It is
also possible that neither the behavioral panel model nor the informal panel model has received judicial attention because the originators of these models did not develop any practical rules of administration, but merely stated their basic propositions. 0 9 These two
systems are important, however, because they present the kernel of
the theory upon which a nonadversarial problem-solving process may
be based.
III.

MEDIATION AND THE MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONAL

Divorce and child custody proceedings are predictably stressful
on most children110 because of fighting between the parents" 1 and
the child's fear of abandonment." 2 This stress can manifest itself in
a regression of the child's psychological development.""' If fighting
between the parents can be minimized, however, the child's psychological development will probably be unhampered."14 Mediation, a
nonadversarial process in which parents meet with a mediator in order to resolve disputes, is praised as being well suited for resolving
the custody problems associated with divorce." 5 Examination of the
cuse, New York. Id.
107. Id.
108. See Rea v. Rea, 195 Or. 252, 277, 245 P.2d 884, 888 (1952); see also supra text
accompanying note 89.

109. See supra note 101.
110.

J. WALLERSTEIN & J.

KELLY, SURVIVING THE BREAKUP

312 (1980). Wallerstein

and Kelly initiated a long-term study of the effects of divorce on children and concluded that
although the degree of stress varies depending on the child's age and developmental stage,

divorce is predictably stressful on most children. Id.
I 11. Id. at 37 (fighting between parents is part of the unsettling chaos for many children
and adolescents).

112. See id. at 312 (abandonment is especially a fear with preschool children); Wallerstein, The Overburdened Child: Some Long-Term Consequencesof Divorce, 19 COLUM. J.L. &
SoC. PROBS. 165, 169, 172 (1985) (abandonment fear is common to children of all ages).
113. J. WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY, supra note 110, at 54.

114. See id. at 316.
115.

See Rigby, Alternate Dispute Resolution, 44 LA. L. REV. 1725, 1743-49 (1984);
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mediator's role in mediation, 11 6 inquiry into whether mental health
professionals can or should serve as mediators," 7 and appraisal of
the arguments for and against mediation, 1 8 leads to the conclusion
that mediation is the best available forum for resolving child custody
disputes. The nonadversarial setting of mediation, combined with the
significant involvement of a mental health professional, allows for
maximum protection of the child's best interests.
A.

Role of the Mediator

The mediator is best described as a referee who is at the proceeding to ensure that the participants focus on custody issues such
as visitation, support, and legal and physical custody, and do not become concerned with tangential problems." 9 Mediation is generally
selected to remove the parties from the adversarial process, thereby
allowing the mediator to gain an awareness of the parties' feelings.
However, just as in litigation, the mediator must always remember
that the child's best interests are of paramount importance. 120
Although there is extensive literature on mediation, it is worthwhile to review briefly the theoretical functions of the mediator in
order to assess the suitability of mediation in the child custody
context.
The mediator basically performs five functions. First, through
discussion with the parties, the mediator ascertains what issues are
disputed and creates a list of problems to be solved, concentrating
first on the most easily solved and gradually working toward the
more difficult.' 2 ' The easiest problems are dealt with first because
solving these problems gives the parties a more positive outlook when
approaching the more difficult ones.
Second, the mediator reduces misunderstanding between the
Pearson & Thoennes, Mediating and Litigating Custody Disputes: A Longitudinal Evaluation, 17 FAm. L.Q. 497 (1983-84). In this article, Pearson and Thoennes collected the results of

the Denver Custody Mediation Project. While only experimental, the Denver Custody Mediation Project provided an opportunity to show the assets of mediation in child custody and

visitation disputes in practice rather than in theory. Id.
116. See infra text accompanying notes 119-132.
117. See infra text accompanying notes 141-45.
118. See infra text accompanying notes 146-64.
119. See Coombs, Noncourt-Connected Mediation and Counseling in Child-Custody
Disputes, 17 FAM. L.Q. 469, 477 (1984).
120. See supra note 33 and accompanying text; Coombs, supra note 119, at 483.
121. Zumeta, Mediation as an Alternative to Litigation in Divorce, 62 MICH. BJ. 434,
437 (1983).
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parties.1 2 This is never accomplished by imposing the mediator's
will upon the mediating parties, but rather by constant reexamination of the parties' positions.112 The examination process reduces
misunderstandings about the desires of each party.
Third, the mediator explores areas of compromise and finds areas of agreement. 2 ' This is by far the most important job performed
by the mediator. The parties presumably have entered mediation to
solve their problems without exposing themselves and their children
to the rigors of litigation. Each area of compromise or agreement in
mediation leaves fewer issues to resolve in an adversary
25
proceeding.
The fourth function of the mediator involves the emotional wellbeing of the parties. The mediator clarifies priority issues and does
not dwell on minor details. 28 He allows free expression of emotions, 27 which is not permitted in a courtroom setting. It is naive to
believe that divorce and the accompanying child custody battle is not
an emotionally traumatic experience for many people. Each parent's
fear of losing the child, even to the other parent, is one reason for
the trauma.128 Providing an arena for the venting of these emotions
allows the parties' true feelings and fears to be discussed, thus aiding
the mediator in his decision as to which parent can better serve the
best interests of the child. The mediator must appreciate the psychological impact of divorce and child custody resolution and must realize that many of the problems are emotional rather than legal.' 29
Finally, the mediator constructs an agreement that can be submitted for inclusion in the final divorce decree. 30 The mediation
agreement can be incorporated into the final divorce decree because
the evidentiary requirements associated with independent mental
122.
123.
124.

Coombs, supra note 119, at 486.
Id.
Id.

125. Cf. Zumeta, supra note 121, at 437 (an agreement is reached only on issues that
are no longer contested after mediation is completed); Coombs, supra note 119, at 478 (an

agreement is reached on those issues which are no longer disputed); but see Stulberg, The
Theory and Practice of Mediation: A Reply to Professor Susskind, 6 VT. L. REv. 85, 101

(1981) (if the mediating parties do not resolve all disputes, they forfeit all agreements that
have been made).
126. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.

127.

Coombs, supra note 119, at 486.

128. Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 360 (W. Va. 1981); see also Pearson & Thoennes, supra note 115, at 498.
129. Comment, The Best Interest of the Divorcing Family-MediationNot Litigation,
29 Loy. L. REv. 55, 70 (1983).
130. Coombs, supra note 119, at 486; Zumeta, supra note 121, at 437.
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health reports131 are not present.13 2

B.

Who Should Serve as the Mediator?

Two professions generally qualify as mediators: lawyers and
mental health professionals. 3a Clearly, the legal knowledge of the
lawyer-mediator offers certain advantages. Knowledge of the relevant law and exposure to the judicial process permits the lawyermediator to be aware of the kind of settlements that judges will usually accept for inclusion in the final divorce decree.134
Nevertheless, there are also problems associated with the use of
lawyer-mediators. When one party to the mediation has a weak argument, the lawyer-mediator's adversarial training might cause him
to favor the party with the stronger argument.1 3 5 Such bias might

eventually force one party to submit to the other against his or her
will. 136 Forcing submission is forbidden by the Standards of Practice
for Family Mediators,1 37 which provides that if the agreement
reached is unreasonable, either party can exercise an option of re138
turning to the adversary process.
Disciplinary Rule 5-105 of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility states that a lawyer may not represent competing parties
to a controversy.1 39 This rule presents potential ethical problems for
131. See supra notes 79-86 and accompanying text.
132. The mediation agreement is similar to a stipulation, see supra note 76. Only issues
that are not contested are included in the agreement between the parties, see supra note 125,
which frees court time to solve other issues.
133. Zumeta, supra note 121, at 434. The mental health professionals who qualify as
mediators include "psychologists, social workers, counselors, or persons with a graduate behavioral science background." Id. See also Pearson & Thoennes, supra note 115, at 502 (in the
Denver Custody Mediation Project, the mediators were limited to mental health professionals
and lawyers).
134. Coombs, supra note 119, at 491.
135. See Tomasic, Mediation as an Alternative to Adjudication: Rhetoric and Reality
In the Neighborhood Justice Movement, in NEIGHBORHOOD JuSTIcE: ASSESSMENT OF AN
EMERGING IDEA 215, 226 (1982) (trainee mediators may resort to coercion); Cf. Coombs,
supra note 119, at 492 (the lawyer-mediator runs the risk of exploiting one party in order to
keep the mediation alive).
136. Coombs, supra note 119, at 492.
137. See Standards of Practicefor Family Mediators, 17 FAM. L.Q. 455, 457-59 (1984)
(if the agreement being reached is unreasonable, or if each party is not able to participate
equally, the process will be terminated) [hereinafter Standards]. These standards were approved with slight modification by the House of Delegates of the American Bar Ass'n on Aug.
8, 1984. The ABA Standards are set out in Standards of Practice for Lawyer Mediators in
Family Disputes, 18 FAm. L.Q. 363 (1984).
138. See id. at 456.
139. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105 (1979); Zumeta, supra
note 121, at 437-38; Coombs, supra note 119, at 492; Comment, supra note 129, at 83.
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lawyer-mediators. A lawyer does not, however, represent either party
in mediation; the lawyer's role at the mediation proceeding is merely
that of a referee. The lawyer's function is simply to aid the mediating parties in reaching an agreement. One commentator notes, however, that when the issues involved are so complex that the parties
truly require separate counsel, the lawyer should not participate in
1 40
mediation.
The strengths of the lawyer-mediator are the weaknesses of the
mental health-mediator. Since the mental health-mediator is unfamiliar with the law, mediation settlement agreements which would
not withstand judicial scrutiny may be reached.141
Another potential problem for the mental health-mediator is the
allegation of unauthorized practice of law. 142 However, just as the
lawyer's participation in mediation does not constitute an ethical violation, this is not an actual problem because mediation is an extrajudicial process wherein the mental health professional acts merely as
a referee between the two mediating parties. 43 While there may be
some legal issues involved in mediation, they are relatively simple
and can be adequately handled by nonlawyers. Furthermore, such
issues are typically deemed to be incidental to the role as a mediator,
and therefore fall outside the unauthorized practice of law provision
44
of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility..
Expertise in dealing with emotional problems is the prime asset
of a mental health-mediator. Judith Wallerstein and Joan Berlin
140.

Zumeta, supra note 121, at 438. The lawyer should not participate as a mediator in

this situation even though the mediating parties are advised to procure outside counsel. Stan-

dards, supra note 137, at 459.
There are also confidentiality problems in mediation. These problems differ between the
lawyer-mediator and the mental health-mediator. The lawyer-mediator may enjoy the traditional attorney-client privilege; however, to protect against any judicial difficulties, the lawyermediator often makes his or her clients sign a confidentiality statement.

The mental health-mediator is at a disadvantage because, while there has been a gradual
acceptance of the confidentiality privilege, the status of the signed agreement is unsettled.

Therefore, from a confidentiality viewpoint, the lawyer-mediator is preferable. Coombs, supra
note 119, at 491, 493-94. The New York legislature recognized this potential problem, however, and drafted a statute which extends confidentiality to mediation proceedings. N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 849-b(6) (McKinney Supp. 1987).
141. Coombs, supra note 119, at 493 (without background to understand the legal is-

sues, a mental health-mediator may create an agreement which is clearly contrary to what
courts will accept).

142. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 3-1 (1978); Coombs,
supra note 119, at 493; Zumeta, supra note 121, at 439.
143. 'See supra text accompanying note 119.
144. Comment, supra note 129, at 85-86.
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Kelly, experts in the field of psychological problems associated with
divorce, point to the importance of mental health professionals in
child custody, commenting that "[m]any adults will need the skilled
help of a neutral counselor or clinician who is well versed in the
psychology of children and in the knowledge of the expectable effects
of divorce on the child's development and [on] the parent-child relationship. ' ' 145 Therefore, the mental health-mediator, as compared to
the lawyer-mediator, can better ease the emotional burden on both
parents and child by minimizing the traumatic effect of a child custody resolution. Since the first four functions of a mediator mentioned above deal with the mental health of mediating parties, it
seems that someone well trained in mental health should be integrally involved in mediation. This leads to the belief that mental
health professionals should play a leading role in mediation.
C. In Praise of Mediation
Child custody mediation is an attractive alternative to litigation
for several reasons. First, it allows the parties to vent emotions and
discuss issues they deem to be important 146 but which may not have
been admissible at trial. This venting of emotions diminishes the
trauma associated with child custody resolution, so that the parties
1 47
can clearly discuss the important issues in their custody decision.
Second, the parties assume an active role in determining their own
future through face-to-face discussion. Face-to-face contact leads to
better communication skills between the spouses, which in turn leads
to a greater ability to resolve conflicts after the divorce. 148
It is arguable that a winner and loser situation exists in mediation just as in litigation, because one party will get legal custody and
the other will get visitation rights. 49 Child custody mediation can,
however, be viewed as ending the winner and loser situation 5" beJ. WALLERSTEIN & J.KELLY, supra note 110, at 318.
146. Coombs, supra note 119, at 486; Pearson & Thoennes, supra note 115, at 498. The
venting of emotion associated with mediation also aids children in mediation who can see their
parents cooperating in the divorce process. Ioannou, It's betterfor the kids, Daily News, Oct.
19, 1986, Business, at 13, col. 2.
147. Coombs, supra note 119, at 486; Pearson & Thoennes, supra note 115, at 498.
148. Comment, supra note 129, at 78.
149. Contra Scott & Derdeyn, supra note 48 (joint custody is an alternative to sole
custody where both parents share the physical and legal custody of the child). In the Denver
Project, 70% of the people who reached agreements in mediation opted for joint custody. Pearson & Thoennes, supra note 115, at 514.
150. Zumeta, supra note 121, at 435; Commission Recommendation on Child Custody,
supra note 3, at 124.

145.
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cause, unlike litigants, mediating parties are able to decide what
they feel is in the child's best interests, instead of leaving that determination to a court with limited knowledge of the parties' true
desires.15 '
Aside from the psychology-based reasons that support mediation as a method for resolving child custody disputes, there are pragmatic considerations as well. Although mediating parties are advised
to consult with an attorney before making final decisions, the parties
do not have to retain an attorney for extended periods of time. Consequently, costs for mediation are generally lower than those of conventional litigation. 152 Moreover, resolving child custody issues
outside the adversarial process allows divorcing parties to reduce the
court costs associated with litigation'5 " because mediation is generally a more rapid process. 154
A problem with child custody litigation exists because the custody determination is usually included in the divorce litigation. 55
Therefore, the final custody decision is bound to the conclusion of
the litigation. This usually leaves the child's fate uncertain for a significant period of time.' 5 6 Although speed should not be used as the
sole justification for choosing mediation over litigation, mediation is
a fairly rapid process, taking an estimated average of only 5.6 hours
to reach a child custody settlement. 57
151.

Note, Determining "'Best Interests" of the Child in Divorce Custody Disputes: A

ProceduralApproach, 9 VT. L. REV. 311, 331-32 (1984).
152. Id. at 332; Pearson & Thoennes, Divorce Mediation: An Overview of Research
Results, 19 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBs. 451, 477 (1985) (parties who successfully mediate
save $380 over successful litigating parties); Pearson & Thoennes, supra note 115, at 507-08.
See also Ioannou, Breaking up is Cheap to do, Daily News, Oct. 19, 1986, Business, at 14,
col. 4 (total expenditure in a divorce mediation is approximately $2,600 to $2,900 while re-

tainer for a matrimonial lawyer in court is $2,500 for each participant).
153. See Note supra note 151, at 332.
154. Coombs, supra note 119, at 485.
155.

See Rigby, Alternate Dispute Resolution, 44 LA. L.

REV.1725,

1726 (1984) (since

about 55% of divorces today involve children, child custody becomes integrally tied to divorce
litigation).
156. Silberman and Schepard, supra note 59, at 412.
157. Coombs, supra note 119, at 485. Commentators note that
successful mediation clients move through the court system faster than their purely
adversarial counterparts . . . .The average number of months between the initiation of proceedings and the promulgation of final orders is lowest for successful

mediation respondents-9.7 months. In the purely adversarial [sample]

. .

.the av-

erage number of months between filing and final orders [is] 11.9 . . .months.

Pearson & Thoennes, supra note 115, at 507. See also Ioannou, supra note 152, at 14, col. 4
(an average mediation takes between 12 and 15 hours).
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D. Criticisms of Mediation
An often mentioned criticism of mediation is that only judges
can competently decide what is in a child's best interests. 158 While
this is persuasive to the extent that judges, by their experience, have
developed a certain degree of expertise in deciding child custody issues, it still ignores the important fact that judges have no background in the mental health field. A related argument against mediation suggests that, because the mediator may not follow guidelines
previously established by courts, the mediation agreement may later
be set aside by the court. 159 If this argument is accepted, however,
parties might never settle their disputes independently of the judicial
system since judges would always be able to substitute their beliefs
for those of the parties involved.
A problem may also develop where two mediating parties do not
have equal financial bargaining power.160 One spouse may be willing
to trade custody of the child for increased alimony later on in the
divorce proceeding.161 In such situations, the parties should not be
involved in mediation at all.1 62 If such parties are involved in mediation, the Standards of Practice for Family Mediators permits
mediators to exercise their discretion to return the controversy to the
adversarial process where the best interests of the child will be
decided. 16 3
Another criticism of child custody mediation is that the parties
do not disclose all of the pertinent information required to decide
child custody, including financial records.164 One must remember,
however, that parties to a child custody case are mediating because
158. See, e.g., Levy, Comment on the Pearson-Thoennes Study and on Mediation, 17
FAM. L.Q. 525, 532 (1984); Note, Committee Decision of Child Custody Disputes and the
Judicial Test of "Best Interests," 73 YALE U. 1201 (1964).
159. Cf In re Michelman, 5 Misc. 2d 570, 135 N.Y.S.2d 608 (Sup. Ct. 1954) (an arbitration agreement may be set aside by the court). But cf. Lasek v. Lasek, 13 A.D.2d 242, 215
N.Y.S.2d 983 (1961) (the right of arbitration as to child support is not questioned).
The difference between arbitration and mediation is that in arbitration a neutral third
party decides the issues, and in mediation a neutral third party facilitates negotiations between
the parties and cannot make recommendations or decisions. Zumeta, supra note 121, at 434.
160. Zumeta, supra note 121, at 435.
161. See Watson, supra note 60, at 59 ("'it is amazing how custodial claims can be
shifted by relinquishment of an appropriate number of dollars!' "); See also Note, Domestic
Violence and Custody Litigation: The Need for Statutory Reform, 13 HOFSTRA L. REv. 407,
422-26 (1985) (a spouse may bargain away child custody for economic gain or loss).
162. Zumeta, supra note 121, at 435.
163. Standards,supra note 137, at 458-59.
164. See id. at 458.
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each wants custody of the child. Through constant probing during
mediation, a party will ferret out facts that the other party may not
willingly acknowledge. This process leads to an appropriate decision
as to which parent may better serve the child's best interests.
IV.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Despite the arguments against mediation, an increasing minority of state legislatures has developed statutory provisions which allow child custody mediation in lieu of litigation.16 5 The California
legislature has gone so far as to mandate that divorcing parties participate in mediation.1 61 Case law in several states whose legislatures
have not yet enacted mediation statutes allows parties to submit
written agreements to the court.16 7 This suggests that written mediation settlement agreements, if submitted to the court, would be
accepted.
States favoring mediation offer a response to the serious problem of overcrowded court dockets. As the number of divorces in the
United States increases,"6 ' courts will be hard put to resolve family
disputes quickly.1 69 Child custody mediation is one way to decrease
the burden on the judiciary and, simultaneously, to aid children by
reducing the stress associated with custody resolution. Mediation is
not, however, a solution for all custody disputes. Situations arise in
which mediation is improper, such as where the parties are unwilling
to negotiate,170 where the parties are unequally educated or have un17 2
equal financial resources,171 or where the issues are too complex.
A solution is available for those who fear putting too much
power in the hands of a mental health professional with a limited
165.

ALASKA STAT.

§ 25.20.080 (1983);

CAL CIV. CODE

§ 4607 (West Supp. 1987);

DEL. FAM. CT. R. 470; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 752(4) (Supp. 1986); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 552.513 (West Supp. 1986); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.081 (West 1981).
166. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4607 (West Supp. 1986).
167. See In re Weidner, 338 N.W.2d 351 (Iowa 1983). "'[T]he court may require the
parties to participate in custody mediation counseling to determine whether joint custody is in
the best interest of the child.'" Id. at 355 (quoting IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.41 (West 1983)).
Cf., e.g., Faherty v. Faherty, 97 N.J. 99, 477 A.2d 1257 (1984) (arbitration agreement was
incorporated into divorce proceeding).
Iowa also has a statute that allows the court to take into account any written agreement
of the parties concerning property distribution. IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.21 (1)(k) (West 1986).
168. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
169. See Kubie, supra note 3, at 1197.
170. Zumeta, supra note 121, at 435.
171. Id.
172. Id.
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knowledge of the law. 173 Instead of choosing either a lawyer-mediator or a mental health-mediator, a joint disciplinary team comprising
both professions could serve as mediators. 17 4 The lawyer-mediator

could be available to instruct the parties as to what the court is
likely to accept. The mental health-mediator could ease the emotional pain inherent in divorce litigation while still ensuring that the
mental health of the child is protected. This is the most effective
alternative for integrating mental health professionals into the child
custody resolution process.175
In custody decisions, courts must realize that they are not dealing with chattels, as the common law viewed children,17 6 nor with

adults who have developed the mental capacity to deal with many of
the traumas of divorce. Courts are dealing with infants 7 7 upon
whom custody determinations may have lasting psychological effects.
Courts should recognize that discretion is the better part of valor
and should defer their decisions to trained mental health professionals who are aware of the complex emotional problems of human relations and the significant role that emotions play in the decisionmaking process. The most feasible way of accomplishing this is through
the implementation of legislation which would remove child custody
decisions from the adversary litigation process and place them in
mediation.
ChristopherAllan Jeffreys

173. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
174. Coombs, supra note 119, at 494.
175. An argument may be raised that the lawyer-mediator would be aiding the mental
health-mediator in an unauthorized practice of law, MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 3 (1978), but because mediation is an extrajudicial process, that argument is
not tenable. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
176. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
177. See, e.g., Rubinstein v. French Hosp., 51 A.D.2d 563, 378 N.Y.S.2d 457 (1976)
(applying a statute which states that people under 18 years of age are infants in New York);
General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Stotsky, 60 Misc. 2d 451, 303 N.Y.S.2d 463 (Sup. Ct.
1969) (infant means any person who has not reached the age of contractual capacity).
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